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ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES: HOW PROTECTIVE
AN UMBRELLA?
SETH M. DABNEYt
BECAUSE it can provide an "umbrella" which shields defendants in an anti-
trust action from future government attack, a consent decree may be more
anxiously sought by defense counsel than dismissal of a case. Such were the
views recently expressed by the majority of Representative Emanuel Celler's
Antitrust Subcommittee in reporting their investigation of the consent decree
program of the Department of Justice. They severely criticized the Attorney
General for accepting a consent decree which in effect placed "the Govern-
ment's imprimatur" upon conduct and relationships which had been attacked in
the complaint. They emphatically preferred the dismissal of a case without
prejudice to the entry of a consent decree which would "prevent a future attor-
ney general... from bringing any effective antitrust action ...." The report
nevertheless recommended that the Department of Justice now take action to
remedy what the Subcommittee majority regarded as the consent decree's
inadequacies.'
Despite the ever-growing number of antitrust cases which have terminated
in consent decrees and the importance of the consent decree as an instrument
of law enforcement, considerable obscurity still surrounds the answers to im-
portant questions raised by the subcommittee's report. How protective an "um-
brella" does an antitrust consent decree provide? Does such a decree lay to
rest, with any measure of finality, further attacks upon the relationships or
conduct alleged to be unlawful in the complaint? Does a consent decree pro-
viding only a part of the relief sought in a complaint effectively foreclose a
subsequent proceeding which seeks to deal more stringently with the defend-
ant?
Government counsel have two obvious ways to seek relief which, for one
reason or another, has been passed over in a consent decree as ultimately
negotiated. They can move in the initial proceeding to modify or to set aside
the decree as entered. Or, choosing to ignore the prior proceeding, they can
commence a new action and request relief similar to that originally sought.
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
As will be shown, the first of these approaches-modification of the decree
-appears to present a difficult course indeed; and if this were the only method
of penetrating the "umbrella," the protection afforded by a consent decree
would appear substantial and well worth the efforts of defendant's counsel to
achieve.
But the second approach, that of a new proceeding, is quite another matter.
Here the "umbrella" develops apparent leaks which in particular cases can
render its protection highly illusory. Of course, whatever its legal effect, in
most instances counsels' bargain will prove a relatively durable one-for the
very practical reason that any wholesale disregard of compromise arrange-
ments would inevitably weaken or destroy the consent decree program as a
method of law enforcement.
Uncertainties about the extent and durability of a consent decree's protec-
tion against future proceedings do, however, affect the course of negotiations.
In bargaining for a settlement, government counsel are sensitive to the possi-
bility of being barred from future action and to the criticisms which such a
self-imposed paralysis might evoke. Defense counsel, on the other hand, strive
for whatever advantages can be gained from such a bar. Neither side can be
sure of the effect of its bargain in this respect. Both sides, therefore, may at
times find advantages in negotiating the substantive provisions of a decree if
the area of uncertainty surrounding the so-called protective umbrella is nar-
rowed by specific terms of the decree itself.
MODIFICATION OF THE PRIOR DECREE
Modification of a consent decree is typically contemplated by the document
itself, which customarily provides that the court shall retain jurisdiction for
the purpose of enabling any of the parties to apply at any time "for such
further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the con-
struction or carrying out of this Final Judgment, or the modification or
termination of any of the provisions thereof. ..."2 Indeed, even without pro-
visions expressly preserving jurisdiction, it is clear that the issuing court
would inherently retain the power either to modify its decree to the extent that
it deemed modification necessary and appropriate or, alternatively, to termi-
nate the decree or some of its provisions. 3
The efforts of government counsel, or, for that matter, defendant's counsel,
to achieve modification or termination have, however, been met with a high
degree of judicial reluctance to overturn the results of a bargain previously
made by the parties and approved by the court. The language of Mr. Justice
2. The quoted language or its equivalent is "boiler plate" in most antitrust decrees,
both litigated and consent, issued in recent years. In addition to providing for a general
retention of jurisdiction, a number of consent decrees have included special modification
provisions. See notes 7, 22 infra.
3. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 1.14 (1932) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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Cardozo, speaking for the Supreme Court in United States z. Swift & Co.,
reflects the applicable rule, at least when a substantial modification is re-
quested: "Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed
after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." 4 On the other
hand, when the Court has regarded a modification as one which did not sub-
stantially change a decree, it has stated the rule less strictly: "The question
is whether the change... [granted by the lower court] amounted to an abuse
of this power to modify. We think that the test to be applied in answering
this question is whether the change served to effectuate or to thwart the basic
purpose of the original consent decree."5
The basic issue in a proceeding to secure a substantial modification is
whether conditions existing at the time modification is sought are different
enough from those which formed the background for the original decree to
justify the requested alteration. Because of this emphasis upon facts, a pro-
ceeding for substantial modification may well involve the introduction of volu-
minous evidence of an economic nature, and be in effect a full trial of limited
issues.0 The Court has emphasized, however, that the inquiry in such a pro-
ceeding is not directed to reversing the original decree under the guise of a
readjustment. It is not a re-examination of the merits of the injunction under
the original facts, but solely a determination of whether the change in cir-
cumstances since the original decree is significant enough to warrant the
modification soughtJ
Strict application of these principles has resulted in a record of reported
decisions in which successful modification of a consent decree, when the
change is opposed by the adverse party, is a rarity-whether modification be
sought by plaintiff or defendant. Thus, the meat packers failed in 1930 to
secure a release from stringent limitations imposed by a 1920 consent decree
upon their dealing at retail in groceries and certain other products.8 The
Department of Justice was unable, in 1923, to secure modification of a 1918
consent decree against International Harvester to require the breaking up of
that company into three independent corporations-relief which had been
4. 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
5. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
6. Failure to provide a full hearing on a "substantial change" in a consent decree is
reversible error. Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
7. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). In order to loosen the
restrictions upon both plaintiff and defendant inherent in the "changed circumstances"
rule, a number of consent decrees have contained, in addition to the general retention-
of-jurisdiction clause, tailor-made provisions setting forth conditions, other than changed
circumstances, upon which modification or termination may be had--either generally or
with respect to particular items of the decree. A number of special provisions of this
character are summarized in note 22 inzfra.
S. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U:S. 106 (1.932). A renewal of efforts by the
packers to modify this decree was begun in 1956 and is now pending. See 1958 Trade
Cas. 73732 (D.D.C.).
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sought in the original complaint but abandoned in the consent settlement."
Attempting unsuccessfully to lay the basis for more extensive substantive re-
lief than was provided in its 1932 consent decree against RCA and others,
the Government similarly failed in a 1942 effort to have the earlier decree
vacated, an action which it maintained would be tantamount to dismissal of
the case without prejudice.10 And despite their earlier success when a two-
year extension was involved," Justice Department attorneys were unable to
secure a modification of the Ford automobile-finance decree which, in effect,
would extend for ten years the time within which the Government was to
obtain similar relief against a chief competitor, General Motors. 12 Of more
recent years, the Schine theatre interests (in 1954) were denied general re-
lief from a five-year-old consent decree provision requiring that all theatres
ordered to be sold be offered only as motion picture houses. 13 And, in 1958,
the Shuberts failed-despite the asserted difficulties of compliance-to obtain
relief from the requirement of their 1956 consent decree that they dispose of
certain theatres.'4
The Justice Department has not been any more successful when it has
sought an "interpretation" of a consent decree amounting, in the Court's view,
to a substantial modification of its provisions. With respect to a decree pro-
viding that a motion-picture industry defendant might "either" sell certain
stock "or" deposit it in a voting trust, the Court rebuffed a government at-
tempt to have the voting-trust provisions construed as requiring sale of the
stock by the voting trustee within a reasonable time.15 And the Liquid Car-
9. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
10. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal
dismissed, 318 U.S. 7% (1943); see note 51 infra.
11. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942); see text accompanying
notes 1.7-19 infra.
12. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948) ; see note 19 infra.
13. United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. 69909 (W.D.
N.Y.).
14. United States v. Shubert, 163 F. Supp. 123 (,S.D.N.Y. 1958). The court's six-
month extension of the time within which the theatres were to be sold was consented to
and, in fact, suggested by the plaintiff.
15. Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952). The Department of Justice has
suggested that the statement of the Supreme Court in the Hughes case that it entertained
"no doubt" of the "power" of the district court to order the divestiture of Hughes' stock
after a proper hearing is indicative of a relaxation of the "changed circumstances" rule in
connection with the modification of consent decrees at the request of the Government.
Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee (Subcommittee No. 5) of the House Com-
inittee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9, pt. 2, at 3748-49 (1958). This sugges-
tion was adopted by the majority of the subcommittee in their report. See SUrBco.,i1x. No. 5,
HousE Co1mm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86Tn CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE
PROGRAM OF THE DEP'T OF JusTicE 5, 293 (Comm. Print 1959). Since the question has not
been put to the Court since the Hughes decision, the Department may prove to be right, but
it would appear to be relying upon a slender reed. The Court's statement was clearly di-
rected to the question of the power of the district court to order divestiture as a form of
relief against an individual rather than a corporation. The Court did not have before it the
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bonic consent decree, requiring the sale of plant property by a court-appointed
trustee within a fixed time, a sale which subsequently proved impossible of
accomplishment, did not admit of an "interpretation" to the effect that use
of the plants by the defendant was thereafter enjoined.' 6
In contrast with this record of unsuccessful modification attempts, a few
reported decisions have allowed modification in the face of opposition by one
or more parties to the consent decree. The best known instance is the Chrysler
Automobile Finance case. The Court there permitted a two-year extension
of the time at which certain provisions of the consent decree were to lapse if
the Government did not obtain similar relief, in a separate proceeding, against
the General Motors Corporation.17 Characterizing its inquiry as a determina-
tion of "whether the change served to effectuate or to thwart the basic pur-
pose of the original consent decree,"' s the Court noted Chrysler's failure to
show that it would suffer a competitive disadvantage if the modification were
allowed, particularly in view of the complete cessation of new-car and light-
truck manufacture wrought by the war. In sustaining the extension, however,
it called attention to the lower court's invitation to Chrysler to come in at
any time and make a showing of competitive disadvantage.'0
Reference to the decree's objectives was also made in Continental Can,
wherein a 1950 consent decree was reformed in 1953. The requirement that
can-closing equipment be rented at "compensatory" rates was, upon an appli-
question of what circumstances might be developed at the hearing which would justify the
use by the district court of its "power" to order this relief and thereby substantially modify
the decree.
16. Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. United States, 350 U.S. 869 (1955), reversing 123 F.
Supp. 653 and 121 F. Supp. 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
17. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942).
18. Id. at 562. The "purpose" test, applied to consent decrees, presents serious prac-
tical difficulties stemming from the usual absence of any record (other than the complaint
and answers, which normally are contradictory), to show what ends the decree, or any
of its provisions, was designed to effectuate. Only rarely does the consent decree itself
contain a recital of objectives or purposes. For examples of this latter type of decree,
see United States v. Continental Can Co., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 63976 (N.D. Cal. 1950)
(art. III(10)), discussed in note 20 infra; United States v. Columbia Artists Manage-
ment Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70830 (S.D.N.Y.) (to facilitate and increase booking of
independently managed artists and to promote competition among defendants and between
independents and defendants in the management of artists).
19. 316 U.S. at 564. The Chrysler decision was distinguished in the subsequent Ford
case in 1948, which involved a parallel decree. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335
U.S. 303 (1948). The Court in the later case pointed out that the two-year extension
permitted in Chrysler had now stretched to ten; that the wartime cessation of car manu-
facture was no longer in effect, and that a showing of competitive disadvantage was
therefore no longer necessary. The crucial fact, it said, was not the degree of disadvantage
but the persistence of an inequality against which protection had been secured in a well-
understood and carefully drawn decree. Chrysler has been rarely cited, and then usually
only for general propositions in conjunction with Swift, International Harvester, and
other early Supreme Court modification decisions.
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cation of the defendant opposed by the plaintiff, modified to require only
"reasonable" rentals.20 The court emphasized that adherence to the decree's
original terms would necessitate rental increases of as much as 108 per cent
and would work an economic hardship on the small canner by, in effect, forc-
ing purchase of the equipment. The decree, it held, was never designed to
operate in so compulsive or arbitrary a fashion.
The reported cases 21 thus indicate rather strongly that, absent special lan-
guage establishing more liberal standards than are implicit in the usual re-
tention-of-jurisdiction clause, 22 neither plaintiff nor defendant in an antitrust
20. United States v. Continental Can Co., 128 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1955). The
original provision required that "reasonable" rentals be maintained until 1954 and that,
thereafter, rentals take into account not less than the aggregate of expenses incurred,
including depreciation, a reasonable return on investment, and the cost of providing ser-
vices in connection with the leasing of machines and equipment. In any proceeding to
enforce this provision the burden was placed upon defendant to establish that its rentals
were in compliance. United States v. Continental Can Co., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 63976
(N.D. Cal. 1.950) (art. 111(10)). The decree also contained an announcement of its
"express purpose" as being "to assure to those interested in owning container closing
machines ... the opportunity to purchase ... and ... for defendant to adopt a policy
of affording to all those desiring such machines . . . every available economic incentive
to purchase ... ." Id. (art III(1)). In modifying the decree, the court required, inter
alia, that rentals not be set so as to make leasing more advantageous than purchasing.
21. Those noted in the text, Chrysler and Continental Can, together with American
Press Assn v. United States, 245 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1917) (modification granted to per-
mit sale of assets to a competitor by defendant unable to continue operations profitably),
are the only reported cases coming to the author's attention in which, absent a special
modification clause or the consent of the adverse party, an antitrust consent decree has
been altered after entry.
22. See note 7 supra. Special modification provisions have been included in consent
decrees for a considerable number of years and have been quite varied. Early examples
are contained in the National Cash Register consent decree of 1916, referred to in Allen
Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1944), and in the
International Harvester decree of 1918 cited in United States v. International Harvester
Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
For more recent cases, see United States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 1957
Trade Cas. 73398 (S.D.N.Y.) (defendant may petition for relief from certain provisions
after ten years upon showing that action contemplated will not substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly) ; United States v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 1957
Trade Cas. 73442 (D. Mass.) (plaintiff after five years may apply for such further re-
lief as it then deems necessary or appropriate; if it seeks divestiture, defendants shall
have burden of establishing why this relief should not be ordered; defendants may seek
modification of any provision in conflict with a marketing agreement with, or an order
of, the Secretary of Agriculture, without showing any other change in circumstances);
United States v. Wolf, 1957 Trade Cas. 73612 (E.D. La.) (defendant may seek modifi-
cation or termination of any provision which it can establish is causing undue hardship
because of federal regulations or rulings governing purchase and sale of cotton) ; United
States v. Meredith Publishing Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 71549 (S.D.N.Y.) (defendant after
one year may obtain relief from injunction against certain resale price maintenance con-
tracts if court shall then determine that the contracts do not violate federal law) ; United
States v. Shubert, 1956 Trade Cas. 71233 (S.D.N.Y.) (if plaintiff, during periods of
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case can realistically expect to achieve the unilateral modification of a consent
decree. Modification depends either upon a substantial and unforeseen change
in conditions since the date of the original decree, or upon the fact that the
change sought is relatively insubstantial and within the agreed-upon purpose
of the original decree. The record of meager success in the modification cases,
however, stands in rather sharp contrast to the possibilities open to plaintiff's
counsel by the institution of a new and separate proceeding.
PROTECTION AGAINST A NEW PROCEEDING
The basic problem in this connection is the extent to which the doctrine of
res judicata applies in a civil antitrust action to foreclose a second attempt
by government counsel to secure relief which, for one reason or another, they
saw fit to do without in a prior proceeding. The observation has been made
that, in a surprising number of the antitrust cases in which a plea of res
judicata might have been anticipated, it was never pressed.23 The disposition
of such pleas as have been made over the years, however, helps to explain the
apparent reticence of counsel to rest upon that defense. Although antitrust
cases in which a plea of res judicata has been the subject of a reported opinion
are relatively few, it is still significant that the plea has successfully barred
a subsequent proceeding in only two instances. In each, the court relied upon
time which may be extended by the court, shows, in a proceeding devoid of any burden
of proof, that independent theatres have not been given opportunity to contract for
Theatre Guild attractions, court may order defendant to refrain from presenting such at-
tractions) ; United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 717.1 (N.D. Ill.)
(defendant, without proving changed circumstances, may apply for permission to acquire
hotels otherwise prohibited by decree upon a satisfactory showing that a proposed acquisi-
tion will not substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly). Still other
variations of special modification clauses may be found in United States v. Kosher
Butchers' Ass'n, 1955 Trade Cas. 70206 (S.D. Cal.) ; United States v. Columbia Artists
Management Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70830 (S.D.N.Y.) ; United States v. Minute Maid
Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. 70673 (S.D. Fla.); United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. 70684 (S.D. Cal.); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
1950-51 Trade Cas. 63976 (N.D. Cal. 1950); United States v. International Nickel Co.
of Canada, 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62634 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cas. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
A subsequent application for modification under a clause of the type here noted is
described in Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., mtpra. There, an
acquisition was permitted over government opposition under a clause of a consent decree
requiring the court to determine whether an acquisition otherwise prohibited (a) would
supplement the defendant's facilities, (b) was sought for that purpose, and (c) would not
substantially lessen competition. See also United States v. International Harvester Co.,
supra at 697, where the plaintiff failed to secure additional relief under a clause permit-
ting reopening after a lapse of time to attain the "object" of restoring "competitive con-
ditions in the . . . interstate business in harvesting machines and other agricultural im-
plements."
23. Black, Res .udicata and Conspiracy Cases Under the Sherman Act, 30 Ky. L.J.
255, 256 (1942).
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the fact that the case involved a private plaintiff.2 4 The amorphous and slip-
pery nature of an antitrust cause of action, the variety of proceedings open
to government counsel, the changes wrought by the passage of time upon the
conduct and composition of affairs that are vulnerable to attack as antitrust
violations, and the obvious reluctance of the courts to preclude the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws-all combine to limit and render uncertain the pro-
tection which a prior decree may afford against subsequent attack.
The doctrinal formulation of res judicata principles in this area is simple
enough in itself. When the prior decree has been consented to by the parties
without actual litigation of any issue, application of the bar ultimately depends
upon a determination by the court that plaintiff's second proceeding presents
the "same cause of action" that was involved in the earlier case.25 A subse-
24. F. L. Mendez & Co. v. General Motors Corp., 161 F.2d 695 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 810 (1947); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464
(3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). The courts held that decisions adverse
to the plaintiffs in previous treble-damage actions based on §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act barred subsequent proceedings in which substantially the same circumstances were
cited as violations of §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court had earlier
reached the opposite result in a case involving § 3 of the Clayton Act in which the United
States was the plaintiff, United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
This decision was distinguished by both the Mendez and Williamson courts on the basis
of the difference in the identity of the plaintiff.
25. The classical statement of the principles of res judicata is contained in Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 ('1876) :
[Where the prior judgment involves] the same claim or demand . . . the
judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent
action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties
and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose. . . . The language, there-
fore, which is so often used, that a judgment estops not only as to every ground
of recovery or defence actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground
which might have been presented, is strictly accurate, when applied to the demand
or claim in controversy. Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, can-
not again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon
any ground whatever.
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim
or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to
those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the
finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply
the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising
in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the
point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what
might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the
judgment conclusive in another action.
See also Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 US. 322 (.1955) ; United States v.
Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 241. (1924) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 45, 46 (1942). Compare
the language in Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 302 U.S. 230, 232 (1937):
the two suits must be "substantially identical in subject matter and issues."
1398 [Vol 68:1391
ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES
quent antitrust proceeding held to constitute a different cause of action is not
foreclosed by a prior consent decree even when the second suit raises an issue
or issues which formed part of the original proceedings, since those issues
have never been actually litigated.20 Inquiry is thus directed only to whether
the same, or different, causes of action underlie the two proceedings .2  Unlike
the many suits-such as an action on a promissory note, for breach of con-
tract, or for negligence-in which the same-cause-of-action test is relatively
easy to apply, in an antitrust case it poses difficult problems of analysis.
The Passage of Time and Intervening Changes
An obvious basis for distinguishing the subsequent action from an earlier
one is provided when the conduct later complained of occurred subsequent to
the earlier proceeding. Such conduct may well be held to create a new cause
of action, even when it is, in essence, a continuation of conduct which, as of
an earlier date, was attacked in the prior proceeding. Thus, the time element
was accorded a position of prominence in Lawlor v. National Screen Service
Corp.,2 one of the few cases in which res judicata in the antitrust context
has come before the Supreme Court. There, seven years after an earlier pri-
vate treble damage action had been dismissed with prejudice before trial pur-
suant to a consent settlement, the plaintiff brought suit against the former
defendants, together with others who, the plaintiff alleged, had since joined
the conspiracy charged in the original complaint. Plaintiff now sought dam-
ages for activities resulting from operation of the conspiracy in the period
subsequent to the earlier suit. Although the court of appeals found-and the
Supreme Court did not dispute-that the later suit involved "essentially the
same course of wrongful conduct," the Supreme Court unanimously reversed
a holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred the second proceeding. The
26. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). Since no issues
would have been tried in the proceeding terminated on consent, there would appear no
possible basis upon which to apply the rule of "collateral estoppel" as that rule is phrased
in Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra note 25, or RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 70
(1942). When, however, the consent decree orders an actual disposition of property, it
may well be that, even in a different proceeding, the merits of that particular disposition,
as distinguished from the underlying issue of law, may be barred to further litigation
between the parties. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1947),
ccrt. denied, 333 U.S. 873 (1948), modifying 64 F. Supp. 656 (S.D:N.Y. 1945); RE-
STATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 75, comment c (1942).
27. The estoppel created when the same cause of action is determined to exist has
been described in broad terms:
When the second suit is between the same parties, or their privies, and upon the
same cause of action as the first, the judgment or decree in the first is conclusive
upon all the parties and their privies in the second suit, not only as to every ques-
tion and issue which was, but also upon every question and issue, claim, or defense
which might have been presented in the first suit.
Miller v. Belvy Oil Co., 248 Fed. 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1917).
28. 349 U.S. 322 (1955).
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same course of wrongful conduct, it theorized, might give rise to more than
one cause of action. Noting the lapse of time, it ruled that, whether the de-
fendant's conduct "be regarded as a series of individual torts or as one con-
tinuing tort," the earlier judgment, though precluding recovery on claims
arising prior to its entry, did not constitute a bar to the subsequent suit. Nor
was this conclusion affected by the fact that in the earlier suit the plaintiff
had sought not only money damages but injunctive relief against continuation
of the alleged conspiracy. The two suits, the Court held, did not involve the
same cause of action.
Even if continuation of the same conduct were held to give rise to the same
cause of action, the defense of res judicata would still be of limited applica-
tion because business situations do not often remain static over a period of
years. Changes in the actors and in the course of conduct complained of quite
naturally tend to evolve during the lapse of time between a first and second
antitrust proceeding. Such changes-new practices, new participants, an in-
crease in the scope of a monopoly position or the expiration of significant
patents-all interrupt the continuity of conduct and have been influential
factors in decisions that a prior proceeding should not bar a subsequent
action.29 The longer the period of time, the more such changes may be found.
As a practical matter, therefore, only a rare case would present solely the
element of time lapse.
Although the passage of time can create a new cause of action, the existence
of an earlier decree is not without practical significance. Plaintiff may not be
barred from instituting a second proceeding, but he may well find the court,
during the trial in that proceeding, unwilling to admit proof which extends
back into the period covered by the earlier case. 30 In particular situations,
such a limitation can be of considerable importance.
The Government's Choice of Proceeding
Iuch the same circumstances may constitute a violation of more than one
provision of the antitrust laws. The resulting alternate remedies and proceed-
ings available in antitrust matters present another avenue of approach for
government counsel who seek to avoid the results of an earlier decree.
Typically, a complaint prepared by the Department of Justice will allege
in general fashion the existence of a conspiracy anong the defendants pro-
ducing a restraint of trade violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. This
general allegation is ordinarily followed by an enumeration of more or less
specifically described activities or relationships which, it is averred, have come
29. See Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); Aluminum
Co. of America v. United States, 302 UjS. 230, affirming 20 F. Supp. 608 (W.D. Pa.
1.937) ; cf. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (involving
an earlier litigated decree).
30. Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees: A Proposal t& the Antitrust Division,
56 MicH. L. Rzv. 1051, 1062 n.50 (1958).
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about pursuant to, and in implementation of, the general conspiracy. Frequent-
ly, the relief demanded is directed primarily at one or more of these specific
activities or relationships. The judgment actually secured in such a case, par-
ticularly when a consent decree is the instrument of redress, often fails to
deal with all of the individually described conspiratorial acts.3 1
But such a final judgment may not set the matter to rest. Particular acts
or relationships which were passed over in the prior decree may themselves
form the basis of an antitrust cause of action, a basis wholly apart from the
general conspiracy of which they were originally alleged to be elements.
3 2
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. 33 provides a good example.
A prior complaint under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act had
charged that a conspiracy existed among the defendant and others to use cer-
tain exclusive dealing contracts in the course of their business. An order to
cease and desist from the unlawful combination had been entered in the prior
proceeding after trial.3 4 Apparently, however, this relief failed to achieve the
results envisioned by the Commission, and its indefatigable staff thereupon
initiated a proceeding under section 3 of the Clayton Act, charging that the
exclusive-dealing contracts themselves were invalid even in the absence of
conspiracy. A new order to cease and desist resulted. To the defendants' con-
tention that the second proceeding was barred by the first, Justice Douglas
simply replied that the former proceeding involved a charge of conspiracy,
not the legality of the contracts themselves.
31. Occasionally, the decree will specifically recite that nothing therein is to be con-
strued as prohibiting certain enumerated activities or types of conduct. These frequently
include activities which otherwise would have been encompassed by broad language used
in the complaint, if not in the decree itself. See, e.g., United States v. National Container
Ass'n, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), and the related Department of Justice
press release, dated December 16, 1940, to the effect that the exception from a decree of
enumerated activities does not signify that these activities are authorized, but rather that
they remain as vulnerable to attack under the antitrust laws as if the decree had not
been entered. Other examples include: United States v. American Ass'n of Advertising
Agencies, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. 71167 (S.D.N.Y.) ; United States v. Textile Refinishers
Ass'n, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70651 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
1952-53 Trade Cas. 67776 (N.D. Ill. 1952); United States v. Institute of Carpet Mfrs.
of America, Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cas. 384 (,S.D.N.Y. 1941). See Isenbergh & Rubin, Anti-
trust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees, 53 HiARv. L. REv. 386, 392-95 (1940).
32. A number of consent decrees in which alleged conspiracies under § .1 of the Sher-
man Act have been enjoined have dealt specifically with the possibility of a subsequent
attack for monopolization in violation of § 2 of the act. They have customarily provided
that entry of the decree is not a bar to subsequent prosecution of such a complaint.
Examples of such decrees are contained in United States v. General Mills, Inc., 1955
Trade Cas. 70619 (E.D. Mich.); United ,States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 1957
Trade Cas. 73398 (S.D.N.Y.). The statement in text is concerned with the situation in
the absence of special provisions and with respect not only to § 2 of the Sherman Act
but to other antitrust provisions as well.
33. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
34. Screen Broadcast Corp., 36 F.T.C. 957 (1.943).
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Finally, respondent urges that the sole issue raised in the Commission's
complaint had been adjudicated in a former proceeding instituted by the
Commission which resulted in a cease and desist order .... But that was
a proceeding to put an end to a conspiracy between respondent and other
distributors involving the use of these exclusive agreements. The present
proceeding charges no conspiracy; it is directed against individual acts
of respondent. The plea of res judicata is therefore not available since
the issues litigated and determined in the present case are not the same
as those in the earlier one.3 5
This result might well have been anticipated in view of the Court's earlier
decision in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States.3" There, the first
complaint, which had been dismissed after trial, had alleged as violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act a consolidation of independent companies
and a system of shoe machinery leases with tying clauses.3 7 Within eight
months of the dismissal, the Department of Justice had filed a new complaint
-this time under section 3 of the Clayton Act-attacking the same restrictive
lease clauses cited in the original allegations. The defendant, of course, pleaded
the dismissal of the prior proceeding as a bar to the later suit. Relying upon
the different statutory bases for the two actions, the Supreme Court over-
ruled the plea.
The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act provide different tests of lia-
bility.... Under the Sherman Act, as interpreted by this court before
the passage of the Clayton Act, contracts were prohibited which unduly
restrain the natural flow of interstate commerce, or which materially in-
terrupt the free exercise of competition in the channels of interstate trade.
In the second section monopolization or attempts to monopolize interstate
trade were condemned. The Clayton Act (3) prohibits contracts of sale,
or leases made upon the condition, agreement or understanding that the
purchaser or lessee shall not deal in or use the goods of a competitor of
the seller or lessor where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract, or
such condition, agreement or understanding "may" be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create monopoly. The cause of action is
therefore not the same.
38
The significance of section 7 of the Clayton Act as a route to a second
attack upon relationships previously assailed as a Sherman Act conspiracy
must also be considered-particularly when an acquisition by the defendants
was specified in the original complaint as one of the steps in the alleged con-
spiracy, but the relationship was left undisturbed by a consent decree. The
35. 344 UaS. at 397-98.
36. 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
37. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918). The action com-
menced on December 12, 1911, and the lower court dismissed the petition on March 18,
1915. Section 3 of the Clayton Act became law in October, 1914. The second proceeding
under that section was begun on October 18, 1915, even before the Supreme Court's de-
cision in the first case.
38. 258 U.S. at 459-60.
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possibilities of using section 7 to reopen the case in such circumstances were
substantially increased by the decision in the duPont-General Motors case, 39
which interpreted the section as applying to acquisitions which may have
occurred many years ago.40
The res judicata implications of parallel action by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission under different sections of the antitrust
law have not yet received careful judicial scrutiny. In the past, those agencies
have not hesitated to proceed separately against the same situation.41 While
this practice has been deprecated 42 and both agencies have in recent years
sought to effect the necessary liaison to avoid rivalry in acquiring jurisdic-
tion,43 the attitude of the courts in Motion Picture Advertising Service and
United Shoe Machinery may suggest that neither agency is barred from ini-
tiating a subsequent proceeding if it is dissatisfied with the results achieved,
or the results it thinks will be achieved, by the other.
The rather rigid adherence to form which characterizes the treatment of
res judicata problems in the antitrust field appears to reflect a judicial attitude
39. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
40. Id. at 596-99. Thus, theoretically at least, only acquisitions occurring prior to the
existence of § 7 of the Clayton Act are immune from this type of attack.
41. Compare FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), with United States v.
Cement Institute, Civil No. 1291, D. Colo. (filed 1945, dismissed 1953). The latter pro-
ceeding was begun by the Department of Justice on June 28, 1945 after the FTC's order
to cease and desist had been entered and while respondent's motion to set it aside was
pending in the court of appeals. Apart from their different statutory bases (the Federal
Trade Commission Act and Sherman Act, respectively), the two proceedings were sub-
stantially identical. A motion in the Sherman Act case to dismiss for mootness, made
after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the FTC suit, failed. United States v.
Cement Institute, 1948-49 Trade Cas. 63341 (D. Colo. 1949). Ultimately, the Department
of Justice was persuaded to dismiss the second action in 1953, five years after the Su-
preme Court had sustained the order issued by the FTC.
The Supreme Court's opinion in the Cement Institute case approaches the problem of
a possible bar resulting from prior action by a different agency under a different section
of the law. The defendants in this case placed heavy reliance upon the Court's earlier
decision in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), an
action by the Department of Justice for alleged violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court ruled that the earlier case had "little relevance, if any at all, to the issues in
the case at bar." 333 U.S. at 706. After distinguishing the two cases on their facts, the
Court went on to point out that: "these marked differences between what a court must
decide in a Sherman Act proceeding and the duty of the Commission in determining
whether conduct is to be classified as an unfair method of competition are enough in and
of themselves to make the Old Cement decision wholly inapplicable . . . . Id. at 709.
The decision of the district court on the mootness motion in the second Department of
Justice case was to much the same effect.
42. "It is basic to all relations between the two agencies that both should never for
any reason, including differences in views as to the law or the facts, proceed against the
same parties for the same offense growing out of the same factual situation." Arr'v" GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 377 (1955).
43. Id. at 376.
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that restrictions upon enforcement of the antitrust laws should be minimized,
at least when the United States or a Government agency is vindicating the
public interest as the party plaintiff. Significantly, when private actions have
been concerned, at least two courts of appeals have explicitly blocked the road
to a second proceeding on the same general facts but under a different pro-
vision of the antitrust laws.44 Both courts adopted essentially the same reason-
ing: a private plaintiff may only recover for damage to or deprivation of a
property right; whether he alleges violation of one statutory proscription or
another, his cause of action for injury to his business or property is the same;
suits by the Government, on the other hand, are to correct or punish separate
offenses, violations of a "distinct and separate statutory duty" ;45 they protect
"public rather than private interests." 46 These decisions, beside reflecting a
judicial distaste for the private antitrust plaintiff, rather clearly affirm the
right of the Government to tread a path barred to the private litigant.
It should be pointed out that in most of the reported decisions in which a
new proceeding has been attempted after entry of an earlier decree, the prior
decree has been entered after litigation rather than by consent of the parties.
Lawlor, involving a private plaintiff, and Aluminums,41 where more than
twenty-five years elapsed between the first and second proceedings, were the
only cases in which the prior judgment was rendered on consent of the parties.
That fact, however, does not present a likely basis for a distinction, for the
elements which differentiate one cause of action from another can hardly be
said to include the manner in which a prior proceeding was terminated 1S
The umbrella of protection afforded by consent judgments, viewed strictly
as a matter of legal right, would thus appear to have a number of substantial
holes in many typical cases. Again, this does not mean that, as a practical
matter, the defendant who accedes to a consent decree may not in fact realize
a substantial measure of protection from his bargain. Certainly, it is most un-
likely that, after the intense and difficult negotiations which produce a consent
settlement, government counsel will tomorrow begin a new and different pro-
ceeding to attack the very situation which yesterday they were willing to in-
clude in their agreement. No course of conduct would be more likely to wreck
44. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951); F. L. Mendez & Co. v. General Motors Corp., 161 F.2d
695 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 810 ,(1947).
45. F. L. Mendez & Co. v. General Motors Corp., sapra note 44, at 693.
46. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, at 468 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
47. Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 302 U.S. 230 (1937).
48. When the prior proceeding has been terminated by consent, however, the absence
of a record makes the problem of determining the nature of the previous cause of action
far more difficult than it is in the case of a litigated decree. The typical generality of
antitrust complaints, often framed with only a very limited knowledge of the facts, makes
them a very unreliable guide to the true cause of action. Indeed, in many instances, until
discovery and pretrial proceedings have reached a fairly advanced stage, not even the
plaintiff is prepared to state the precise cause of action involved.
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the consent settlement program which over recent years has accounted for
more than three-quarters of all antitrust cases brought by the Department of
Justice.: 9 Nor is it very likely that one enforcement agency will immediately
take up its cudgels to assail what another agency has seen fit to accept.
At the same time, many factors can affect the permanence of the peace
which the consent judgment initially produces. Changes in the national poli-
tical administration and consequent changes in the policy-making personnel
of enforcement agencies may well produce a re-examination of action taken
in the past. The critical attention of Congress, or, more particularly, of prom-
inent members of investigating committees, can also catalyze a shift of posi-
tion within the agency. Even such factors as the presence of particularly
zealous staff members, some of whom may have disagreed with the original
decision, the prominence of the defendants or of the practices excluded from
the settlement, the extent and nature of the publicity which the decree, its
operation (or its later investigation) arouses-all these can play a role in
the determination of whether, at some subsequent date, new action will be
taken.
In point of fact, only in a few instances has the Government actually moved
through the medium of a new proceeding to challenge the results of a bargain
made in an earlier, unlitigated consent decree. 50 Only two of these instances
have produced reported decisions in which the effect of the prior decree was
considered-the Aluminmm case, in which some twenty-seven years had
elapsed between the proceedings, and the RCA case 51 in which twenty years
had intervened. Instead, the record of reported decisions indicates that the
Government, when it has sought to recant its earlier bargains, has moved
more forthrightly to modify the earlier decree or to have it set aside.
49. Ar' Y GEN. NAI'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 360 (1955) ; Senate Select Committee
on Small Business, The Role of Private Antitrtst Enforcenent in Protecting Small
Business-1958, S. REP. No. 1855, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1.958).
50. There have been a number of other situations in which a prior consent decree
has been pleaded in a subsequent proceeding as an affirmative defense in the nature of
res judicata. See, e.g., the answer of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in United
States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 86-27, S.D.N.Y., April 21, 1953, and the defendants'
answer in United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49, D.N.J., Jan. 14, 1949.
The latter pleading is reproduced in Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee (Sub-
committee No. 5) of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9,
pt. 2, at 1799 (1958).
51. The second civil proceeding, begun in 1954, was itself terminated by consent de-
cree in 1958. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 1958 Trade Cas. 74559 (S.D.
N.Y.). It was preceded by a grand jury investigation in 1952, during the course of
which RCA moved to quash the subpoena addressed to it on the ground that the matters
sought to be investigated were barred from further civil or criminal proceedings by
RCA's 1932 consent decree. The court declined to quash the subpoena, ruling that what-
ever might be the merit of the plea of bar, it was prematurely raised since the indict-
ment had not yet been handed down. Application of Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D.
167, 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
19591 1405
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
NEGOTIATING THE UMBRELLA
It seems clear from the more than occasional appearance in consent decrees
of provisions designed to preserve to the Government some opportunity to
proceed anew, as well as from statements like those of Mr. K-ramer before the
Celler subcommittee, 52 that the possibility of being barred from further proceed-
ings is a matter of some importance to the Attorney General and his staff in
negotiating a consent decree. Particularly must this be the case when they con-
clude that, for one reason or another, the tactical situation indicates a settlement
for only a fraction of the relief requested in the complaint. Without question,
also, defendants in determining to accept a consent judgment place some reliance
upon whatever promise the decree holds as a bar to further government pro-
ceedings. In both cases, however, weight is being attached to legal consequences
which are at best uncertain, concerning which the parties may not agree, and
upon which each may place a different value. Might it not be advisable in these
circumstances for the parties, in their negotiations, to discuss and, if possible,
to agree upon the scope of the protective umbrella?
Certainly an entirely legitimate object of consent decree negotiation is to
achieve a permanent bargain disposing of all possibilities of future litigation
over the same matter. Complete protection may well be impossible because of
the effect of the passage of time and the fluidity of business conduct in creat-
ing new causes of action. The degree of protection attainable can, however,
be substantially increased by an appropriate specification of the cause or causes
of action to be disposed of by entry of the proposed consent decreeY3 To
accomplish such specificity, the charges of the complaint itself, as well as the
terms of the decree, might fairly be made a subject of negotiation. This, of
course, could more readily be done when consent-decree negotiations antedate
the filing of the complaint.5 4 If, however, the complaint has already been filed,
its amendment pursuant to the negotiations would not be impossible. Counsel
might also do well to consider the practical value of including in the terms
of the decree express provisions which declare particular activities or relation-
ships to be outside the decree's prohibitions 5 or which recite the extent to
which the decree is intended to operate as a limitation upon proof in a sub-
sequent proceeding.5 6
52. See note 1 saupra.
53. Such a specification, for example, might effectively limit the opportunities of
government counsel to bring a second proceeding of the type described in the text accom-
panying note 33 supra.
54. AiT'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. A XTUSr REP. 360 (.1955).
55. If the policy expressed in the National Container press release of 1940, note 31
.,pra, is still adhered to by the Department of Justice, and if that policy is acted upon,
the value of the type provision described would probably be limited to defining with
greater precision the scope of the decree's injunctive proscriptions.
56. As suggested in the text accompanying note 30 supra, a consent decree may have
important effects in this respect, which it may be in the interests of the parties to con-
trol. Whether or not a definition of the intended evidentiary effects would be deemed
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Whatever the difficulties of foreclosing subsequent proceedings by the Gov-
ernment, there would appear to be little difficulty, if any, in specifying with-
in the terms of a consent decree the areas in which later moves, either by the
Government or by the defendants, are not foreclosed. Reference has already
been made to the variety of provisions, appearing with increasing frequency
in consent decrees, designed to clarify the extent to which future modifications
or new proceedings are intended to be permitted.5 7 Such provisions, perhaps
together with a general stipulation that the relief awarded in the decree is to
endure only for a fixed period of years, would appear to constitute an effective
means of placing definite limitations upon the bars, both legal and practical,
which may otherwise stem from a consent decree.
Whether the parties to a particular negotiation wish to strengthen or to
limit the protective umbrella, they are more apt to reach a mutually satisfac-
tory agreement about the substantive provisions of the decree if they can
accurately assess the permanency of the proposed bargain. The government
negotiator who is precluded from further relief, or who thinks he may be,
will probably drive a harder bargain on substantive relief than he would if,
by specific provisions, he explicitly retained some freedom of action. The de-
fendant who can thereby achieve a less onerous judgment may find it advan-
tageous to accept an umbrella expressly limited in scope, particularly if he
is aware of the umbrella's already circumscribed and uncertain protection.
In many instances, the inclusion of a fixed term for the duration of a decree
may be regarded as salutory by both sides-placing a definite limit both upon
impediments to future government action and upon the period during which
injunctive provisions, which may prove more burdensome than anticipated,
must be endured by the defendant.
The subject of defining the decree's future operation may prove to be one
upon which agreement cannot be reached. The desirability of raising the prob-
lem during negotiations will, of course, vary from case to case. Nevertheless,
counsel for both sides would be wise to consider whether, in the circum-
stances of the particular proceeding, their clients' interests are better served
by the perpetuation of uncertainty or by defining the umbrella's protective
attributes.
controlling, such special provisions would, at least, be influential in the trial court's deter-
mination of what limits it should place upon the proof of matters antedating the decree.
57. See notes 22, 32 supra. Although such clauses have been used with increasing
frequency in consent decrees, the Department of Justice has apparently not sought an
actual modification under this kind of provision since its unsuccessful experience in the
International Harvester case (274 U.S. 693) in 1923. See note 22 and the text accom-
panying note 9 supra. One former high-ranking member of the Antitrust Division's staff
has expressed a dim view of their value to the Government in consent decrees, as dis-
tinguished from decrees entered after litigation. Kramer, srpra -note 30, at 1061. In view
of this limited experience and the development of clauses far more explicit than that in-
volved in Harvester, it would hardly seem that such pessimism is justified.
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